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Recent developments in psychology (e.g., Nuzzo, 2014; Trafimow, 2014; Woolston, 2015a)
are showing apparently reasonable but inherently flawed positions against data testing
techniques (often called hypothesis testing techniques, even when they do not test hypotheses
but assume them true for testing purposes). These positions are such as banning testing
explicitly and most inferential statistics implicitly (Trafimow and Marks, 2015, for Basic and
Applied Social Psychology—but see Woolston, 2015a, expanded in http://www.nature.com/news/
psychology-journal-bans-p-values-1.17001), recommending substituting confidence intervals for
null hypothesis significant testing (NHST) explicitly and for all other data testing implicitly
(Cumming, 2014, for Psychological Science—but see Perezgonzalez, 2015a; Savalei and Dunn,
2015), and recommending research preregistration as a solution to the low publication of non-
significant results (e.g., Woolston, 2015b). In reading Woolston’s articles, readers’ comments
to such articles, and the related literature, it appears that philosophical misinterpretations of
old, already discussed by, for example, Meehl (1997), Nickerson (2000), Kline (2004), and
Goodman (2008), are not getting through and still need to be re-addressed today. I believe
that a chief source of misinterpretations is the current NHST framework, an incompatible
mishmash between the testing theories of Fisher and of Neyman-Pearson (Gigerenzer,
2004). The resulting misinterpretations have both a statistical and a theoretical background.
Statistical misinterpretations of p-values have been addressed elsewhere (Perezgonzalez, 2015c),
thus I reserve this article for resolving theoretical misinterpretations regarding statistical
significance.
The main confusions regarding statistical significance can be summarized in the following seven
points (e.g. Kline, 2004): (1) significance implies an important, real effect size; (2) no significance
implies a trivial effect size; (3) significance disproves the tested hypothesis; (4) significance proves
the alternative hypothesis; (5) significance exonerates the methodology used; (6) no significance is
explainable by bad methodology; and (7) no significance in a follow up study means a replication
failure. These seven points can be discussed according to two concerns: the meaning of significance
itself, and the meaning, or role, of testing.
In this article I will avoid NHST and, instead, refer to either Fisher’s or Neyman-
Pearson’s approaches, when appropriate. I will also avoid their conceptual mix-up by using
different concepts, those which seem most coherent under each approach. Thus, Fisher’s seeks
significant results, tests data on a null hypothesis (H0) and uses levels of significance (sig)
to ascertain the probability of the data under H0 (Figure 1A). Neyman-Pearson’s seeks to
make a decision, tests data on a main hypothesis (HM) and decides in favor of an alternative
hypothesis (HA) according to a cut-off calculated a priori based on sample size (N), Type
I error probability (α), effect size (MES) and power (1-β), the latter two provided by HA
(Figure 1B).
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FIGURE 1 | Fisher’s (A) and Neyman-Pearson’s (B) approaches to data
testing mapped onto a t-test distribution with 64 degrees of freedom.
The Meaning of Significance
Misinterpretations (1) and (2) are due to confusing statistical
significance, theoretical or practical significance, and effect sizes.
The latter are a property of populations, may vary from large
to small, can be put into a number, and can be calculated with
the appropriate formula (Cohen, 1988). Practical significance is a
subjective assessment of the importance of such effect (they can
be considered as two sides of the same coin).
As per statistical significance, because testing is done
on samples, it is the equivalent population effects in the
corresponding sampling distributions which are of relevance,
to be found in the tail (or tails) of such distributions. When
using these techniques, therefore, important effects become
extreme results—i.e., results with low p-values—under the tested
hypotheses.
To help with inferences, a cut-off is used to partition the
corresponding sampling distribution between extreme and not-
extreme-enough results. This is, of course, a pragmatic choice,
but it implies that the meaning of significance ultimately depends
on where such cut-off falls. This cut-off also partitions the
effect size between important and unimportant effects for testing
purposes.
Under Neyman-Pearson’s approach (e.g., 1933; Figure 1B),
the mathematically-set cut-off partitions the effect size a priori
(the minimum effect size, MES, is the value of the population
effect size at such point; Perezgonzalez, 2015b). Statistical
significance, thus, has no inherent meaning under this approach
other than to identify extreme results beyond the set cut-off.
Because the sample size is controlled, mainly to ensure power,
such extreme results are not only more probable under HA but
also reflect important population effects.
Under Fisher’s approach (e.g., 1954, 1960; Figure 1A), either
experience-driven or conventional cut-offs help flag noteworthy
results—these are properly significant, as in “notable,” “worthy
of attention”—whose primary value is in their role as evidence
for rejecting H0. Because there is no inherent control of sample
size, a large sample may be used if it leads to the rejection
of H0 more readily—thus, a significant result is technically
important. Whether it is really important, however, we cannot
know (we ought to wait and calculate the effect size a posteriori),
but we may assume an unknown MES with boundaries at the
appropriate level of significance. Posterior calculations normally
shows that when the sample is small, significant results reflect
large effect sizes; as the sample grows larger, the resulting effect
sizes may shrink into triviality.
Curiously, then, misinterpretations (1) and (2) are only
possible under Fisher’s approach depending ultimately on the size
of the sample used. With small samples—which is the paradigm
that Fisher developed—significant results normally do reflect
important effects—thus, (1) is typically not a misinterpretation—
however some of the non-significant results may also reflect
sizeable effects—thus, misinterpretation (2) is still possible.
The opposite occurs with larger samples: Effect sizes may
be of any size, including negligible ones, and still turn out
statistically significant—thus, misinterpretation (1) is plausible—
while non-significant results will often be negligible—thus,
misinterpretation (2) is not so, but a correct interpretation.
Under Neyman-Pearson’s approach, on the other hand,
effect sizes are those of populations, known (or fixed) before
conducting the research. These effect sizes can, of course, be
set differently by different researchers, yet such decision has a
technical consequence on the test thereof: It makes a posteriori
interpretations of effect sizes meaningless. Thus, an extreme
result—accepted under HA—is always important because the
researcher decided so when setting the test; a not-so-extreme
result—accepted under HM—is always trivial for similar reasons;
therefore, as far as any particular test result is concerned, (1) and
(2) cannot be considered misinterpretations proper under this
approach.
The Meaning of Data Testing
The remaning misinterpretations have to do with confusing
research substance and data testing technicality. Meehl (1997)
provided clear admonition about the substantive aspects of
theory appraisal. He set down a conceptual formula for
correlating a set of observations with a theory and related
components. His formula includes not only the theory under
test—from which the statistical hypothesis supposedly flaws—
but also auxiliary theories, the everything-else-being-equal
assumption (ceteris paribus), and reporting quality—all of
which address misinterpretations (3) and (4)—as well as
methodological quality—which addresses misinterpretations (5)
and (6). Thus, the observation of a significant or extreme result
is, at most, able to falsify only the conjunction of elements in the
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formula instead of the theory under test—i.e., either the theory
is false, or the auxiliary theories are false, or the ceteris paribus
clause is false, or the particulars reported are wrong, or the
methodology is flawed. Furthermore, Meehl argues, following the
Popperian dictum a theory cannot be proved, so a non-significant
or not-extreme-enough result cannot be used for such purpose,
either.
Meehl may have slipped on the technicality of testing,
though, still confusing a substantive hypothesis—albeit a very
specific one—with a statistical hypothesis. Technically speaking,
a statistical hypothesis (H0, HM, HA) provides the appropriate
frequency distribution for testing research data and, thus, needs
to be (technically) true. Therefore, these hypotheses cannot
be either proved or disproved—i.e., disproving a statistical
hypothesis invalidates both the test and the results used to
disprove it! From this follows that the gap between the
statistical hypothesis and the related substantive hypothesis that
supposedly flaws from the theory under appraisal cannot be
closed statistically but only epistemologically (Perezgonzalez,
2015b).
Therefore, misinterpretations (3) and (4) have conflating
technical and substantive causes. Meehl’s (1997) formula resolves
the substantive aspect, while a technical argument can also
be advanced as a solution: Statistical hypotheses need to be
(assumed) true and, thus, can be neither proved nor disproved
by the research data.
As for misinterpretations (5) and (6), about methodology,
these too are resolved by Meehl’s formula. Methodological
quality is a necessary element for theory appraisal, yet also an
independent element in the formula; thus, we may observe a
particular research result independently of the quality of the
methods used. This is something which is reasonable and may
need no further discussion, yet it is also something which tends
to appear divorced from the research process in psychological
reporting. Indeed, psychological articles tend to address research
limitations only at the end, in the discussion and conclusion
section (see, for example, American Psychological Association’s
style recommendations, 2010), something which reads more as
an act of contrition than as reassurance that those limitations
have been taken into account in the research.
Finally, a technical point can also be advanced for resolving
the replicationmisinterpretation (7). Depending on the approach
used, replication necessitates either of a cumulative meta-analysis
(Fisher’s approach; Braver et al., 2014) or of a count of the
number of replications carried out (Neyman-Pearson’s approach;
Perezgonzalez, 2015a,d). A single replication may suffix the
former, yet it is the significance of the meta-analysis, not of
the individual studies, that counts. As for the latter, one would
expect a minimum number of replications (i.e., four) in order
to ascertain the power of the study (i.e., a minimum of four
successful studies out of five for ascertaining 80% power); a single
replication is, thus, not enough. Therefore, the significance or
extremeness of a single replication cannot be considered enough
ground for either supporting or contradicting a previous study.
Corollary
Late developments in the editorial policies for the journals Basic
and Applied Social Psychology, and Psychological Science aim
to improve the quality of the papers submitted for publication
(similar attempts have already been attempted in the past—
e.g., Loftus, 1993; Kendall, 1997—with rather limited success—
e.g., Finch et al., 2004; Fidler et al., 2005). They do so
by banning or strongly discouraging the use of inferential
tools, more specifically data testing procedures. There are
important theoretical and philosophical reasons for supporting
the banning of NHST (e.g., Nickerson, 2000), but these do
not necessarily extend to either Fisher’s or Neyman-Pearson’s
procedures or to the remaining of the inferential toolbox. The
main problem seems to lie with misinterpretations borne out
of NHST and the way statistics is taught. P-values are often
misinterpreted as providing information they do not—something
that may be resolved by simply substituting frequency-
based heuristics for the probabilistic heuristics currently used
(e.g., Perezgonzalez, 2015c). On the other hand, statistical
significance is often misinterpreted as practical importance.
Substantive arguments about theory appraisal can resolve
some of the misinterpretations, although this requires some
reading about epistemology (e.g., Meehl, 1997). Furthermore,
technical arguments can also be advanced to resolve other
misinterpretations. Many of these confusions could be easily
captured and prevented at pedagogical levels, thus highlighting
the important role of doing so when teaching statistics. The risk
of not doing so is transferred forward to the rest of psychology,
which may suffer when misunderstood testing procedures and
other inferential tools are discouraged or banned outright
for the purpose of, paradoxically, improving psychological
science.
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